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Abstract
In June 2018, the UK Government announced a review of the ban on standing at football matches in the Premier League 
and Championship. Nearly 30 years since the Hillsborough disaster, there is growing interest in the introduction of safe-
standing to football grounds in England and Wales. This paper considers official reports dating back to 1924 in an attempt 
to understand the woeful safety record of UK football grounds in the twentieth century, and the many missed opportunities 
to secure the safety of fans. The argument is made that Taylor LJ’s lack of trust in both the desire and ability of footballing 
authorities and clubs to ensure fan safety led him to make all-seating a cornerstone of his vision for football. The current law 
is then reviewed before considering how safe-standing differs from the crumbling and overcrowded terraces of the 1980s. 
The paper concludes that stadium and crowd management measures, backed up by a robust regulatory system which has the 
support of all stakeholders, are necessary to ensure the continuing safety of football fans in England and Wales.
Keywords Safe standing · Sports Law · Regulation · Hillsborough
1 Introduction
The expert Report of the Technical Working Party which 
assisted Taylor LJ’s Inquiry into the Hillsborough stadium 
disaster included the observation that “Whilst standing 
accommodation is not intrinsically unsafe, all-seater sta-
dia bring benefits to spectator comfort, safety and crowd 
control”.1 Taylor went on to conclude “There is no pana-
cea which will achieve total safety and cure all problems of 
behaviour and crowd control. But I am satisfied that seating 
does more to achieve those objectives than any other sin-
gle measure”.2 None of the reports into crowd safety in the 
twentieth century had found any inherent danger in stand-
ing on the terraces, and standing areas are still permitted 
in the leagues beneath the Premier League and Champion-
ship provided they meet regulatory standards. The causes of 
the many previous incidents and disasters were the absence 
of basic and rudimentary safety practices concerning sta-
dium and crowd management, primarily relating to the 
calculation of capacity and match day attendance. The rec-
ommendations of those earlier reports were ignored until 
1973. When a system of licensing was introduced by the 
Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 (SSGA 1975), it failed 
to change entrenched practices and attitudes to safety. Rather 
than safety per se, it was Taylor LJ’s determination to change 
attitudes and usher in a “new ethos for football” that led him 
to recommend all-seated stadiums.
There is now heightened interest in the introduction of 
“safe-standing” to football stadiums in England and Wales 
through the use of the rail-seat. Each ticket holder is desig-
nated a specific seat. The seat can be locked into an upright 
position for games where standing is allowed and each row 
of seats has a barrier for fans to lean on which ensures that 
fans occupy a specific and easily identifiable place. Safe-
standing areas already exist in the German Bundesliga, the 
Dutch Eredivisie, and, in 2016, Scottish Premier League 
club Celtic installed a 2600 capacity area. This paper begins 
by considering what was unsafe about the old standing ter-
races, the failure of the licensing system and what motivated 
Taylor LJ to recommend all-seated grounds. Attention then 
turns to the nature of safe-standing, whether the rail-seat  * David Rigg  d.rigg@mmu.ac.uk
1 Manchester Law School, Manchester Metropolitan 
University, Lower Ormond Street, Manchester M15 6BH, 
UK
1 Taylor (1990), appendix 3, p. 95 at para 3.
2 Ibid, para 61.
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addresses Taylor’s concerns and whether the rail-seat might 
already comply with existing legislation. The argument is 
made that, just as all-seated stadiums were never suggested 
as a panacea to achieve total safety and cure all problems of 
crowd control, neither can the same be said of safe-standing.
2  Sixty‑six years of missed opportunities
Of the 41 disasters and incidents involving death or injury 
at British football grounds between 1888 and 1989, crowd 
pressure, either direct or leading to structural collapses, was 
the immediate cause of all except the 1985 Bradford and 
Birmingham tragedies.3 Despite this, prior to Taylor’s Final 
Report, no report had given any serious consideration to the 
introduction of all-seating. The Interim Popplewell Report, 
which preceded the Hillsborough Inquiry by 4 years, dis-
missed the idea: “it failed to take account of the idiosyncra-
sies of football fans. A lot of them it seems do not wish to 
sit down; they wish to stand. They wish to stand, apparently, 
because there is for them a special atmosphere associated with 
being on the terraces. If seating is provided for them they may 
well tip back the seats and stand in front of them; then stand 
on the seats; and finally rip up the seats and use them as weap-
ons”.4 This analysis is demonstrative of the approach, com-
mon at the time, which conflated crowd control with ground 
safety, and assumed that hooliganism was a greater threat to 
spectator safety than crumbling and mismanaged grounds.
Both the Shortt Report 1924 and the Moelwyn Hughes 
Report 1946 contained recommendations which, if imple-
mented and robustly administered, would have prevented 
Hillsborough.5 The Shortt Report recommended that the 
number of entrances and exits to grounds should be ade-
quate with not less than one turnstile for every 1250 fans 
(the affected terrace at Hillsborough had seven turnstiles for 
10,100 ticketed fans); with other turnstiles held in reserve 
and distributed around the circumference of the ground (there 
were no reserve turnstiles at Hillsborough) and clear signage 
stating the area of the ground to which each entrance gives 
access (the signage at Hillsborough was criticised for draw-
ing fans to the overcrowded pens behind the goalmouth).
The Moelwyn Hughes Report recommended scientific cal-
culation of the maximum number to be allowed entry to the 
ground and individual enclosures, counting those entering the 
ground by mechanical means, and central coordination of the 
system to ensure the admission of a safe number of specta-
tors. At the time of the disaster, the capacity of Hillsborough 
was inaccurate following renovations in 1981. There was no 
calculation of the capacity of individual enclosures on the 
Leppings End and no separate access to those enclosures. 
Overcrowding could occur even if the overall attendance for 
the stand was theoretically safe. The recommendations of the 
Shortt and Moelwyn-Hughes Reports were not adopted and a 
system of self-regulation was preferred by government. The 
reports did not recommend seating as a solution to crowd 
safety, but instead emphasised the importance of basic safety 
features which begin with the safe management of the crowd 
outside of the ground. It is implicit in both reports that a mix-
ture of ground management and crowd management meas-
ures are necessary to ensure crowd safety.
2.1  The failure of the licensing system
A system of licensing for “designated grounds” by local 
authorities was in place by the time of Hillsborough follow-
ing the SSGA 1975.6 The Act included many recommenda-
tions of the Wheatley Report 1973, which followed the deaths 
of 66 people crushed on a stairway at Ibrox Park, Glasgow. 
The deficiencies of the licensing system had already been 
exposed by the 1985 Bradford City fire which killed 56 peo-
ple. Although the Bradford City ground was not a “designated 
ground” for the purpose of the 1975 Act, an earlier visit by a 
member of the local authority Safety Team had highlighted 
a number of serious health and safety considerations which 
would need addressing if the ground ever did require a licence 
under the Act. The Popplewell Final Report found that both 
the SSGA 1975 licensing system and the associated Green 
Guide7 had been “disregarded” by non-designated clubs.8
3 Elliott et al. (1999), p 19.
4 Popplewell (1985), para 6.16.
5 See further James (2017) pp 200–202.
6 Until 1985, to meet the vociferous concerns regarding the potential 
cost to smaller clubs, only those grounds accommodating more than 
10,000 spectators in Divisions One and Two of the Football League, 
the Premier League in Scotland and certain international football and 
Rugby League stadia were given designated status. The Interim Pop-
plewell Report resulted in designated status being extended immedi-
ately to all clubs in the top four English divisions and the Scottish 
Premier League and all major rugby league grounds. Following the 
Final Popplewell Report, the Safety of Sports Grounds (Designation) 
Order 1986/1296 added all major rugby union, cricket and athletics 
grounds to the licensing regime of the 1975 Act. The designation has 
since been reduced to 5000 spectators for football but remains 10,000 
spectators for other sports: The Safety of Sports Grounds (Accommo-
dation of Spectators) Order 1996/499.
7 The Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds, known as The Green 
Guide, provides detailed technical guidance on safety matters at 
sports grounds. It has no statutory force, but many of its recommen-
dations will be made statutory at individual grounds by their inclu-
sion in safety certificates issued under the Safety of Sports Grounds 
Act 1975 or the Fire Safety and Safety of Places of Sport Act 1987. 
See Department for Media, Culture and Sport (2008) The Guide to 
Safety at Sports Grounds (5th edn). http://www.safet yatsp ortsg round 
s.org.uk/sites /defau lt/files /publi catio ns/green -guide .pdf. Accessed 6 
June 2018.
8 Popplewell (1986), para 3.5.
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In contrast, Popplewell found that the SSGA 1975 had 
increased safety at designated grounds: “[M]y enquiries into 
the workings of the Act have shown that in designated stadia 
it has proved effective in ensuring improvements in safety”.9 
The Hillsborough disaster showed Popplewell’s confidence 
in the system to be misplaced. Hillsborough was a desig-
nated ground, but the stadium safety certificate had been 
invalid since 1981 after Sheffield City Council had failed to 
reduce the capacity in the stadium safety certificate to reflect 
alterations to the Leppings End Terrace.10 Indeed, a recom-
mendation of Popplewell’s Final Report had been for the 
annual renewal of safety certificates and a duty on the local 
authority to annually inspect the premises prior to re-issu-
ing the certificate.11 Taylor held that the existing legislative 
framework “had not been strong enough to ensure the basic 
level of safety” and discovered multiple departures from 
the Green Guide (including provisions on crowd density, 
good practice on counting fans in, the number of turnstiles 
for individual sections and rate of admission per turnstile, 
insufficient emergency exits, and the strength and spacing of 
crush barriers).12 It is of note that as well as being departures 
from the guidance provided by the Green Guide, these short-
comings were each the subject of recommendations in the 
Shortt and Moelwyn Hughes Reports. Taylor LJ described 
the City Council and the Stadium Advisory Group, tasked 
with operating the licensing system at Hillsborough, vari-
ously as “inefficient”, “dilatory”, “casual” and “unbusiness-
like”.13 A defect in the licensing system had directly contrib-
uted to the Hillsborough disaster: whilst safety certificates 
had to specify the maximum capacity of the stadium, they 
did not have to specify the maximum number of spectators 
to be admitted to different parts of a stadium.14 The SSGA 
1975 licensing system represented improvement on what 
little preceded it, but Hillsborough exposed its largely inef-
fective operation.
2.2  A question of trust
Although Popplewell rejected the introduction of all-seated 
grounds, he did encourage clubs to improve their facilities: 
“I have little doubt that the provision of good facilities at 
football grounds is likely to result in better behaviour from 
the fans”.15 Only one English Football League stadium was 
built between 1936 and 1988.16 Stories of dilapidated stadi-
ums from this time are notorious, and it is a common theme 
of previous reports. As early as 1946, the Moelwyn Hughes 
Report had observed that Burnden Park was “typical of most 
home grounds of the leading football teams in the country. 
They have grown stage by stage from humble beginnings 
on sites acquired when the large gates of these days were 
not anticipated”.17 This theme continued in the Wheatley 
Report 1973: “The development of grounds has been some-
what haphazard in most cases, much depending on available 
financial resources … [A]s a result there are few standard 
features in the detailed composition of football grounds and 
at times even in various sections of the same ground”.18 The 
Interim Popplewell Report 1985 noted “A lot of grounds are 
old. The turnstiles were perfectly adequate to admit fans into 
the ground at a time when it mattered not on which terrace 
they stood. Now that there is segregation the siting of many 
turnstiles I have seen leaves much to be desired”.19
For Taylor, the state of football grounds was indicative 
of, at best, complacency and, at worst, institutionalised dis-
regard for the safety of supporters. Whilst Popplewell had 
considered and dismissed all-seating as a mechanism for 
controlling fans, Taylor presented it as the cornerstone of his 
vision for “A Better Future for Football”. At the heart of his 
recommendations was the conviction that upgraded stadiums 
would themselves contribute to better safety. This point is 
particularly pertinent to his rationale for all-seated stadiums:
“What is required is the vision and imagination to 
achieve a new ethos for football. Grounds should be 
upgraded. Attitudes should be more welcoming. The 
aim should be to provide more modern and comfort-
able accommodation, better and more varied facilities, 
more consultation with the supporters and more posi-
tive leadership. If such a policy is implemented it will 
not only improve safety. There will also be an improve-
ment in behaviour, making crowd control easier”.20
Taylor’s vision would provide a justification for any 
improvement in facilities and accommodation, however 
modest, which raises the question why his proposals went 
so much further. Much of the discussion regarding seating 
in Taylor’s Final Report is predicated on the matter being 
one which would force a change in attitudes amongst clubs 
and authorities who could not otherwise be trusted to arrest 
9 Ibid, para 3.4.
10 At the time of Taylor’s Inquiry, Sheffield United Football Club’s 
Bramhall Lane ground had never had a safety certificate issued 
despite being a designated ground since July 1984.
11 Popplewell (1986), p 64.
12 Taylor (1990), p. 24, para 140.
13 Taylor (1989) p. 51.
14 Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975, Section 2(1)(b).
15 Popplewell (1986), p 47.
16 Prior to 1988, the last newly built Football League ground in 
England was Roots Hall, Southend, opened in 1955. Glanford Park, 
Scunthorpe, opened in 1988.
17 Moelwyn Hughes (1946), p 10.
18 Wheatley (1972), p 21.
19 Popplewell (1985), p 48.
20 Taylor (1990), p 12, para 59.
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the malaise in the game. The Final Report is peppered with 
criticism of stakeholders. Firstly, the FA and The Football 
League were criticised in the following terms:
“One would have hoped that the upper echelons … 
would have taken a lead in securing reasonable safety 
and comfort for spectators and in enforcing good 
behaviour by precept and example. Unfortunately, 
these hopes have not generally been realised and 
indeed at times poor examples have been set”.21
Then:
“As for the clubs, in some instances it is legitimate to 
wonder whether the directors are genuinely interested 
in the welfare of their grass-roots supporters”.22
The apparent indifference of the footballing authorities to 
safety was longstanding. As long ago as 1924, the FA had 
refused to appear at the Shortt Committee. Johnes has criti-
cised the “misplaced trust” in clubs and the game’s authori-
ties: “Clubs and the sport’s authorities were run by a mixture 
of small businessmen and gentleman whose full-time pro-
fessions lay elsewhere. They were far from knowledgeable 
about crowd management themselves”.23
Taylor was assisted in the preparation of his Final 
Report by the Report of the Technical Working Party which 
included the recommendation that “Whilst standing accom-
modation is not intrinsically unsafe, all-seater stadia bring 
benefits to spectator comfort, safety and crowd control”.24 
The Final Report made no reference to this significant con-
cession and only contains a brief passage on the safety fea-
tures of all-seating:
“It is obvious that sitting for the duration of the match 
is more comfortable than standing. It is also safer. 
When a spectator is seated he has his own small piece 
of territory in which he can feel reasonably secure. He 
will not be in close physical contact with those around 
him. He will not be jostled or moved about by swaying 
or surging. Small or infirm or elderly men and women 
as well as young children are not buffeted, smothered 
or unsighted by larger and more robust people as on 
the terraces. The seated spectator is not subject to 
pressure of numbers behind or around him during the 
match. He will not be painfully bent double over a 
crush barrier. Those monitoring numbers will know 
exactly how many are there without having to count 
them in or assess the density by visual impression”.25
The last point rests on the assumption that a safe number 
of fans are admitted to a seating area. The tragic events in 
all-seated South African football stadiums demonstrate that 
other features of stadium and crowd management measures 
must also be present.26 All-seating increases the likeli-
hood that fans have their own space and are considerably 
less likely to be subject to pressure of numbers, but there is 
equally no reason why a carefully managed safe-standing 
area which complied with mandatory Green Guide standards 
could not provide the same level of safety. The Government 
made such a concession in 1992 by limiting the all-seated 
policy to the top two divisions with the implication that ter-
racing was safe, or could be made safe, in the other divi-
sions. Taylor simply did not countenance the possibility of 
managing and upgrading terraces to ensure crowd safety, 
and expert evidence was not called to test the possibility or 
project the potential costs.27
The brevity with which Taylor dealt with the safety 
aspects of all-seating, coupled with his condemnation of 
the failure of clubs and authorities to take responsibility for 
safety, supports the argument that he did not trust clubs and 
the authorities to improve grounds without such revolution-
ary change being imposed. In doing so, Taylor swapped the 
much-criticised National Membership Scheme for a policy 
which placed the greater responsibility on clubs to force 
a change in their attitude to the safety of fans.28 Minutes 
from the meeting of the UK Government Cabinet at which 
the Final Report was discussed describe it as “flawed in a 
number of respects”.29 The Cabinet minutes make no link 
between the woeful safety situation at Hillsborough and 
the resulting disaster, instead focusing on hooliganism and 
crowd control: “[Taylor’s] thesis that poor behaviour was 
the result of poor facilities at grounds was not consistent 
with the fact that behaviour at matches had been perfectly 
satisfactory when facilities at grounds had been much less 
developed then they were now”.30 The then Home Secretary, 
Douglas Hurd, in a speech to the House of Commons two 
days after the disaster had announced that “The Govern-
ment believe that the future of football in this country lies 
in a national membership scheme in designated grounds and 
now, it seems, also in providing all-seated accommodation at 
25 Ibid, p 12 para 62.
26 See below at Sect. 4.
27 See further Elliott et al (1999), p 22.
28 The National Membership Scheme was a proposal of the Interim 
Popplewell Report. Supporters would be required to present a mem-
bership card when purchasing tickets and gaining entrance to desig-
nated grounds. The Scheme was included in the Football Spectators 
Act 1989 but has never been brought into operation after Taylor iden-
tified a number of concerns with the Scheme in his Final Report.
29 The National Archives, Conclusions of Cabinet Minutes 25 Janu-
ary 1990, CAB128/96/3 p.1.
30 Ibid, p.2.
21 Ibid p 9, para 51.
22 Ibid p 10, para 53.
23 Johnes (2005), p 12.
24 Taylor (1990), p 95, para 3.
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major football clubs. This would involve the disappearance 
of terraces at those grounds. It might also involve amend-
ments to strengthen the Football Spectators Bill so that its 
provision for the licensing of grounds matched this con-
cept”.31 The Government’s position gave every indication 
that all-seating was primarily viewed through the “hooligan 
lens” as a method of crowd control. A careful reading of the 
Taylor Reports makes it clear that crowd control was at most 
incidental to his support for the policy.
3  The law on all‑seated stadia
The all-seated recommendation was included in the Foot-
ball Spectators Act 1989 (FSA 1989) which was passing 
through Parliament at the time of Taylor’s Inquiry. Section 9 
makes it an offence to admit spectators to a designated foot-
ball match without a licence to admit spectators being in 
force.32 To enforce the arrangements, the FSA 1989 set up 
the Football Licensing Authority (now the Sports Ground 
Safety Authority (SGSA)) to operate a licensing system for 
grounds used for designated football matches.33 The SGSA 
issues an annual licence to each club which specifies the 
areas of the ground to which spectators may be admitted. 
The all-seater requirement is included as a condition in the 
annual licence. The specific conditions of the licence are 
prescribed in secondary legislation made by the Secretary 
of State under Section 11:
The Secretary of State may, by order, direct the licens-
ing authority to include in any licence to admit spec-
tators to any specified premises a condition imposing 
requirements as respects the seating of spectators at 
designated football matches at the premises; and it 
shall be the duty of the authority to comply with the 
direction.
The list of specified premises is updated when new 
stadiums are built.34 Taylor’s Final Report had recom-
mended that grounds in the first and second divisions of the 
Football League (now the Premier League and Champion-
ship) and national stadia should be all-seated by the start of 
the 1994/1995 season. All other league football stadiums 
(those that are now in English Football Leagues 1 and 2) 
were to provide all-seated accommodation by the start of the 
1999–2000 season. In 1992, the Government dropped that 
requirement and permitted those clubs to retain terracing 
provided it met certain safety standards. This is one of many 
inherent contradictions in the all-seating policy. Standing 
is considered to be too dangerous at Premier League and 
Championship stadiums but not at lower league grounds, 
some of which can attract higher attendances than Cham-
pionship grounds.
Clubs promoted to the Championship for the first time 
have up to 3 years to convert any standing areas to seats. If 
the club is relegated from the Championship, it is a condi-
tion of the licence that the ground must remain all-seated. If 
a club is relegated before the 3 years has expired, and at the 
time it is relegated it has not yet converted its ground to all-
seating, when it is next promoted any time previously spent 
in the Championship or Premiership is counted towards the 
3 years. The all-seated policy also applies to the new home 
ground of any club whose existing ground is all-seated, but 
a new order would be required as seating orders are ground 
specific.35
The FSA 1989 does not extend to Scotland where there 
are no legislative provisions requiring all-seated accom-
modation. The SSGA 1975 licensing system applies and 
requires the owners of sports grounds in Scotland to apply to 
the local authority for a safety certificate. The local authori-
ties are advised by Safety Advisory Groups on the basis 
of the Green Guide. The Scottish Premier League (SPL) 
makes it a condition of membership that clubs provide all-
seated accommodation. This condition was relaxed in 2011 
to allow clubs to apply to the SPL Board to pilot safe-stand-
ing areas.36 Where approval by the SPL is given, further 
approval is then required from the local authority. In July 
2016, SPL club Celtic installed 2600 rail-seats at Celtic 
Park. This is the first safe-standing area to be used by fans 
at a UK football match.
Taylor’s recommendation that all designated sports 
grounds be all-seated (under the SSGA 1975 this would have 
applied to any sports ground that held more than 10,000 
spectators) has never been taken up by government. Other 
sports grounds are not covered by the all-seating require-
ment and licences issued by the SGSA do not apply to 
31 Quoted in Taylor (1990), p 15, para 84.
32 Designated football matches are those designated under s.1(2) 
Football Spectators (Designation of Football Matches in England and 
Wales) Order 2000 (SI 2000/3331) as “any association football match 
which is played at Wembley Stadium, at the Millennium Stadium in 
Cardiff or at a sports ground in England and Wales which is regis-
tered with the Football League or the Football Association Premier 
League as the home ground of a club which is a member of the Foot-
ball League or the Football Association Premier League at the time 
the match is played”.
33 See s.10 FSA 1989 for the licensing procedure.
34 The Football Spectators (Seating Order) 2016 (2016 No. 629) 
added the London Stadium at the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park, the 
home of West Ham United.
35 Explanatory Memorandum to The Football Spectators (Seating 
Order) 2016 (2016 No.629) at para. 7.3.
36 See Scottish Professional Football League (2011) SPL Statement: 
Rule Changes. https ://spfl.co.uk/news/artic le/spl-state ment-rule-
chang es-2011-12-19/. Accessed 6 June 2018.
 The International Sports Law Journal
1 3
non-football events, such as concerts or rugby matches, tak-
ing place at a football ground. This anomaly means that a 
dual use stadium, such as Ashton Gate which is the home 
ground of Bristol City Football Club and Bristol Rugby, has 
rail-seating installed which allows fans to stand at a rugby 
match but cannot be used at a football match.37
4  What is safe‑standing and does it address 
the concerns expressed by Taylor LJ 
and earlier reports?
The Football Supporters’ Federation (FSF) has been at the 
forefront of a campaign to bring safe-standing areas to UK 
football grounds. The FSF was formed in the wake of the 
Heysel disaster, 1985, and describes itself as “the democratic 
organisation representing the rights of fans and arguing the 
views of football supporters in England and Wales”.38 In 
March 2011, it launched a safe-standing campaign “to per-
suade the Government, football authorities and football 
clubs to accept the case for introducing, on a trial basis, 
limited sections of standing areas at selected grounds in the 
stadiums of Premier League and Championship football 
clubs”.39 The campaign, which builds on research of exist-
ing safe-standing areas at grounds in Europe, has the support 
of 26 clubs and the SPL.
Although some European clubs provide ad hoc seat-
ing on terraces through the use of a fold away seat where 
the seat is folded away under terrace steps when standing 
is permitted, or the more rudimentary “bolt on” seat, safe-
standing as envisaged by the FSF is radically different. 
The “safe-standing” used at Celtic Park and widely used 
in the Bundesliga and by Dutch Eredivisie clubs PSV Ein-
dhoven and Ajax involves a so-called “rail-seat”: typically 
a 370 mm × 500 mm seat with a 900 mm high rail for fans 
to lean on when standing which ensures fans have a specific 
space in which to stand and would discourage migratory 
crowd movement during a game. The seat folds back and can 
be locked into an upright position for games where standing 
is allowed and unlocked to allow use of the seat at games in, 
for example, UEFA and FIFA competitions which require 
all-seated stadiums. The very term “terrace” is a misnomer 
when describing rail-seating technology for two significant 
reasons: the barrier, which accompanies each row of rail-
seats, is continuous to prevent crowd surging (including at 
the corner of grounds), and each fan is allocated a specific 
rail-seat. There are other examples of safe-standing areas 
outside of Europe, including Major League Soccer side 
Orlando City.
The causes of previous incidents and disasters were the 
absence of basic and rudimentary safety practices concern-
ing stadium management and crowd control measures, 
primarily relating to the calculation of capacity and match 
day attendance. Rail-seating appears to address the specific 
recommendations of the line of reports dating back to 1924. 
The characteristics of a rail-seat satisfy Taylor LJ’s four-
point justification for all-seating:
the fan has his own small piece of territory in which he 
can feel reasonably secure; he is not subject to pressure 
of numbers behind or around him during the match; 
he will not be painfully bent double over a crush bar-
rier; those monitoring numbers will know exactly how 
many are there without having to count them in or 
assess the density by visual impression.40
However, all-seated areas are only safe provided a safe 
number of fans are allowed entry and the other features of 
good stadium crowd management are present. The insuf-
ficient number of turnstiles at Hillsborough which led to the 
opening of Gate C to relieve crushing outside of the ground, 
together with the lamentable match day command and the 
presence of perimeter fencing, does not support an argument 
that all-seating would have prevented all the fatalities that 
day. A safe-standing area is no different and requires a high 
level of stadium and crowd management, such as effective 
policing and stewarding procedures, strict control of capac-
ities and measurement of attendance, and high-resolution 
CCTV, all of which are common practice today at designated 
stadiums in England and Wales.
The findings of the Hillsborough Inquest in April 2016 
have added greater cogency to the arguments in favour of 
safe-standing by confirming the causes of the disaster and 
removing any doubt that the practice of standing on the ter-
races per se contributed to the disaster.41 The Inquest jury 
found that the immediate cause of the disaster was crush-
ing caused by the admission of a large number of support-
ers through the exit gates. A number of specific findings of 
fault were made against South Yorkshire Police in respect of 
errors and omissions in policing the crowd both inside and 
41 See HC Deb 27 April 2016, vol 608, cols 1433-1437 for the State-
ment of the Home Secretary to the House of Commons which con-
tains the findings of the Inquest Jury.
37 See further Keppel-Palmer (2014) Stand up for seating: Why all-
seated football stadia should be reconsidered. Law in Sport. https ://
www.lawin sport .com/topic s/artic les/item/stand -up-for-seati ng-why-
all-seate d-footb all-stadi a-shoul d-be-recon sider ed. Accessed 6 June 
2018.
38 Football Supporters’ Federation (2018).
 http://www.fsf.org.uk/about -us/. Accessed 6 June 2018.
39 Ibid.
 http://www.fsf.org.uk/campa igns/safe-stand ing. Accessed 6 June 
2018.
40 Taylor (1990), p 12, para 62.
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outside the stadium; Sheffield Wednesday Football Club in 
respect of failing to address known defects in the stadium 
and failing to improve access to the Leppings End and its 
turnstiles; and Sheffield City Council for failing to investi-
gate the earlier changes made to the Leppings End which 
should have reduced its capacity and led to an update to 
the stadium safety certificate. More than 25 years since the 
Taylor Reports, the findings of the Inquest have changed 
the political context of the safe-standing debate by confirm-
ing the overriding importance of robust stadium and crowd 
management measures rather than resting on the assumption 
that all-seating provides the only answer.
The dangers inherent in a poorly managed all-seated sta-
dium are exemplified by the disaster at Ellis Park, Johannes-
burg, 11 April 2001, where 43 died following overcrowding. 
In circumstances familiar to observers of English football in 
the 1970s and 1980s, around 80,000 fans attended a 60,000 
capacity stadium. The subsequent report found that, inter 
alia, a mixture of poor crowd management outside of the sta-
dium with thousands attempting to purchase tickets immedi-
ately before the match, an insufficient number of turnstiles, 
no one person in overall command to make decisions as the 
disaster unfolded, and a system of unreserved seating were 
to blame. Recommendations followed those of the Shortt 
and Moelwyn Hughes Reports and included the counting of 
fans as they enter the ground with the information continu-
ously fed to a central point, a number of turnstiles that is 
commensurate with the ground capacity, and the creation of 
a trained body of stewards.42 In July 2017, delays outside at 
the all-seater FNB Stadium, Johannesburg, which had hosted 
games at the 2010 World Cup, led to a stampede which left 
two fans dead.
4.1  Unsafe seating
There is a growing argument that the introduction of safe-
standing might itself be justified on safety concerns regard-
ing persistent standing in seated areas. Safety in seated areas 
was a motivating factor for Ajax to introduce rail-seating 
after a fan was seriously injured after falling off the first tier 
of a stand and other examples of progressive crowd collapse 
where standing fans fall forward in a domino effect. The 
principle safety risk exists when spectators fall over the seat 
in front of them, which has not been designed for standing 
spectators. Standing in seated areas is also more likely to 
result in standing spectators spilling out into gangways and 
blocking exits and encourage children to stand on seats to 
see over the heads of those in front.43 The English law on 
all-seated stadiums only stipulates that seats be provided 
and it is not a criminal offence if a fan decides not to use the 
seat. In reality, ground regulations usually make it a breach 
of the entry ticket’s terms and conditions for spectators to 
stand during a match.
In November 2013, a Joint Statement “Standing in Seated 
Areas at Football Grounds” was released by a number of 
key regulatory bodies including the Sports Grounds Safety 
Authority, FA Premier League and Football League.44 The 
report noted that, “it is preferable for standing in seated areas 
to be addressed primarily through the education, persua-
sion and positive management of spectators. However, such 
measures alone have not always achieved the desired results. 
To the extent that they continue to prove insufficient, they 
may need to be backed up by more robust action”.45 The 
Report reminds clubs that standing in seated areas can pre-
sent a serious safety hazard and regulatory sanctions exist 
including the SGSA’s power to impose conditions in the 
local authority’s safety certificate for the ground, such as  
reducing capacity at matches where safety concerns are 
anticipated.46 The desire to prevent persistent standing in 
seated areas was a key factor behind West Bromwich Albion 
Football Club’s application to the SGSA for permission 
to pilot 3600 rail-seats for the 2018/19 season which was 
rejected by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and 
Sport.47
4.2  How safe‑standing could be introduced
The success of the Celtic Park safe-standing pilot has 
emboldened advocates of safe-standing in England and 
Wales. The introduction of safe-standing areas could be 
achieved relatively straightforwardly by the introduction of 
secondary legislation which removed the requirement for 
all-seating in the licence issued by the SGSA. This would 
require revision of guidance in the Green Guide to incor-
porate recommendations on safe-standing. There is also an 
argument that rail-seating already complies with the cur-
rent law on all-seated stadia. In February 2017, the SGSA 
published a document outlining a process for clubs in 
England and Wales who do not come within the all-seated 
42 See further Commission Of Inquiry Into The Ellis Park Stadium 
Soccer Disaster Of 11 April 2001 (2002).
 https ://www.gksti ll.com/Suppo rt/Links /Docum ents/2002-ngoep 
e.pdf. Accessed 6 June 2018.
43 Sports Grounds Safety Authority et al (2013), pp 10–11.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid, p 3.
46 Ibid, pp 6–7.
47 See BBC (2018) Safe standing: West Bromwich Albion have pro-
posal rejected by government. https ://www.bbc.co.uk/sport /footb 
all/43701 400. Accessed 6 June 2018.
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requirement to install rail-seating.48 The SGSA makes it 
clear that a successful application would carry consider-
able risk for the club if it was subsequently promoted to 
the Championship: “unless Government policy changes, 
any club which had installed dual purpose seating/standing 
areas would be unlikely to be able to secure a licence for this 
area once they have been in the Championship or Premier 
League for more than 3 years”.49 This is highly debatable. 
The Green Guide specifies minimum dimensions for new 
seats as 460 mm wide and 700 mm deep, but there is no 
definition of “seated accommodation” in the FSA 1989.50 
Rail-seats which are locked into a seated position satisfy 
the requirement for all-seated accommodation in UEFA and 
FIFA competitions. Provided correctly dimensioned rail-
seats are locked into a seated position in England and Wales, 
it would be difficult to argue that a club was not providing 
“seated accommodation” under the FSA 1989 if the matter 
went to judicial review. Any challenge against a contrary 
finding would benefit from the rules of statutory interpreta-
tion. Literally, in the absence of further definition, “seated 
accommodation” is somewhere to sit and the dimensions of 
a rail-seat comply with the Green Guide recommendations 
on seated accommodation. The mischief which the all-seated 
policy was designed to remedy was crushing, and the rail 
for each row guards against this. By extension, the purpose 
of the all-seating policy was to make stadiums safer, which 
rail-seating achieves. Indeed, the presence of a rail for each 
row reduces the likelihood of injuries suffered when stand-
ing in a seated area.
The arguments above, though, understate the political 
reality of the situation and the symbolic nature of a policy 
drafted in the aftermath of what remains the worst sporting 
disaster in the UK and which has dominated public con-
sciousness for nearly 30 years. Primary legislation would 
not be necessary but it would be politically expedient. The 
Liberal Democrats included safe standing as a manifesto 
pledge in 2015 and a Private Member’s Bill failed in 2010 
for lack of parliamentary time. The Safe Standing (Football 
Stadia) Bill proposed an amendment to Section 11 of the 
FSA 1989 which would require a licence to stipulate the 
number of spectators for whom seating is provided and the 
number of spectators for whom standing accommodation 
is provided but no condition that seating be required for all 
spectators.51 Although political momentum for a change in 
the law is growing, the Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport has consistently reiterated it is “unconvinced” on the 
matter and in April 2018 rejected an application by Premier 
League club West Bromwich Albion to install a pilot area. 
In June 2018, a debate was held in the House of Commons 
following an online petition calling for the introduction of 
safe-standing at Premier League and Championship grounds 
which was signed by more 112,000 people.52 The speeches 
made by Members of Parliament (MPs) were mindful of 
public opinion on the matter which suggests strong support 
for a change in the law. MPs were overwhelmingly in favour 
of allowing clubs the choice to install safe-standing areas. 
The Minister responsible concluded by announcing a review 
of the existing policy but warned “Change cannot and should 
not happen overnight on something as serious as football 
ground safety”.53
5  Conclusion
The all-seated requirement has ushered in wholescale 
changes to the ethos of football in the UK. Since the Final 
Taylor Report, there have been numerous new stadiums built 
and a number of large modernisation projects of existing sta-
diums. The changes brought by all-seating have been subject 
to widespread criticism regarding the commercialisation of 
the game, price inflation and demographic change that are 
beyond the scope of this paper. What is not in doubt is that 
football grounds are safer today than at any point in the his-
tory of the game. The wholescale changes in the attitudes of 
the footballing authorities towards spectator safety mean that 
new safe standing technology is highly unlikely to herald 
a return to the bad days of the unmanaged, or unmanage-
able, terrace. Safe-standing, as the name suggests, does not 
mean a return to the days of the crumbling and overcrowded 
terraces. However, just as all-seated stadiums were never 
suggested as a panacea to achieve total safety and cure all 
problems of crowd control, neither can the same be assumed 
of safe-standing. A hundred years of missed opportunities, 
together with sobering examples from modern all-seated 
stadia in South Africa, demonstrate that stadium and crowd 
management measures, backed up by a robust regulatory 
system and the support of clubs and the authorities, are nec-
essary to ensure the continuing safety of football fans in 
England and Wales. Thirty years since the worst sporting 
48 Sports Grounds Safety Authority (2017) Process for considera-
tion of the installation of dual-purpose seating and standing areas by 
clubs not subject to the all-seater requirement. http://www.safet yatsp 
ortsg round s.org.uk/sites /defau lt/files /docum ents/SGSA%20dua l%20
pur pose%20are a%20lic ensin g%20pro cess%20FIN AL.pdf. Accessed 
6 June 2018.
49 Ibid p 2.
50 The Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds (2008) p 116.
51 Safe Standing (Football Stadia) Bill 2010, Bill 121.
52 See https ://petit ion.parli ament .uk/petit ions/20704 0. Accessed 6 
June 2018.
53 HC Deb 25 June 2018, vol 243, col 274WH.
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disaster in the UK, it is unsurprising that no consensus has 
yet emerged on this emotive subject.
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